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Abstract
We use modal logic to obtain syntactical, proof-theoretic versions of transfinite in-
duction as axioms or rules within an appropriate labelled sequent calculus. While
transfinite induction proper, also known as Noetherian induction, can be represented
by a rule, the variant in which induction is done up to an arbitrary but fixed level
happens to correspond to the Go¨del–Lo¨b axiom of provability logic. To verify the
practicability of our approach in actual practice, we sketch a fairly universal pattern
for proof transformation and test its use in several cases. Among other things, we
give a direct and elementary syntactical proof of Segerberg’s theorem that the Go¨del–
Lo¨b axiom characterises precisely the (converse) well-founded and transitive Kripke
frames.
Keywords: Induction principles, elementary proofs, modal logic, proof theory,
Kripke model, sequent calculus.
1 Introduction
At least since Peano formalised what we all know as mathematical induction,
induction as a proof principle has been the main tool for tidily unwrapping the
potential infinite as generated by an a priori incomplete process. This is well
reflected by the ubiquity of definitions and proofs by induction in today’s ever
more formal sciences.
Transfinite induction is a generalisation of mathematical induction from the
natural numbers to less down-to-earth well-founded orders, such as the ordinal
numbers. More precisely, if (and only if) any given order is well-founded,
then induction holds: in the sense that a predicate holds everywhere in the
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given order provided that the predicate is progressive, i.e. propagates from all
predecessors of a given element to the element itself.
As a rule of thumb, instances of induction are applicable more directly,
and are better behaved proof-theoretically, than the corresponding instances
of well-foundedness, which come as extremum principles or chain conditions
(see, e.g., Proposition 4.2 below). Characteristic examples include Aczel’s Set
Induction [1–3] versus von Neumann and Zermelo’s Axiom of Foundation or
Regularity, and Raoult’s Open Induction [4,11,27] as opposed to Zorn’s Lemma.
Awareness of this phenomenon brought us to carry over to the inductive side
some occurrences of well-foundedness in the modal logic of provability. Perhaps
Segerberg’s theorem [35], which stood right at the beginning of an impressive
development [9], is the most prominent case: the Go¨del–Lo¨b axiom charac-
terises exactly the (converse) well-founded and transitive Kripke frames. 1 The
observation that those occurrences are rather about induction prompted the
present investigation.
Inasmuch as instances of induction are about predicates or subsets, they
typically go beyond the given logical level, and actually have a somewhat se-
mantic flavour [12, 13]. By modal logic [5, 24, 26] we now obtain syntactical,
proof-theoretic variants of induction: they are expressed as axioms or rules
within an adequate labelled sequent calculus [21, 23]. While induction proper,
for which we say Noetherian induction, can be mirrored by a rule (Lemma
3.3), the variant in which induction is done up to an arbitrary but fixed point
of the given order, which we dub Go¨del–Lo¨b induction, happens to correspond
(Lemma 3.1) to the homonymous axiom of provability logic [6,7,19,36,38]. 2 In
fact the usual way to define validity in a Kripke model for the modal operator
2 lends itself naturally to capture universal validity up to a point.
To verify the practicability of our approach in proof practice, we give a
fairly universal pattern for proof transformation, from rather algebraic induc-
tive proofs to formal proofs with the required rules, and test this in several
cases. Among other things, we prove with the corresponding modal rules that
induction necessitates the order under consideration to be irreflexive (Lemma
4.1), and that every meet-closed inductive predicate on a poset propagates from
the irreducible elements to any element whatsoever (Example 3.5) [28, 31, 32].
As a by product we gain the curiosity that Noetherian induction is tantamount
to the corresponding chain condition plus irreflexivity (Proposition 4.2). 3 Last
but not least we give a direct and elementary syntactical proof (Theorem 4.3) of
Segerberg’s aforementioned theorem that the Go¨del–Lo¨b axiom holds exactly
in the (converse) well-founded and transitive Kripke frames. All this can also
be useful in proof practice: while it might be cumbersome to prove directly
that an induction principle holds for a given order, it is often easier to check
properties such as irreflexivity and transitivity, or even chain conditions.
1 See also, for example, Theorem 3.5 of [37], Example 3.9 of [5] and Teorema 7.2 of [24].
2 This was also called axiom A3 [37], the Lo¨b formula L [5] and axiom G or axiom W [17,23].
3 Needless to say, this requires some countable choice.
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2 Basic modal logic K
Modal logic is obtained from propositional logic by adding the modal operator
 to the language of propositional logic. A Kripke model [18] (X,R, val) is a
set X together with an accessibility relation R, i.e. a binary relation between
elements of X, and a valuation val, i.e. a function assigning one of the truth
values 0 or 1 to an element x of X and an atomic formula P . The usual notation
is for val(x, P ) = 1 is x  P .
We read “xRy” as “y is accessible from x” and we read “x  P” as “x
forces P”. Valuations are extended in a unique way to arbitrary formulae by
means of inductive clauses:
x 1 ⊥
x  A ⊃ B if and only if x  A⇒ x  B
x  A ∧B if and only if x  A and x  B
x  A ∨B if and only if x  A or x  B
x  A if and only if ∀y(xRy ⇒ y  A)
We assume that x  P is decidable for every x ∈ X and each atomic formula
P , which carries over to arbitrary formulae by the inductive clauses. With the
intended applications in mind, in place of R we use the inverse accessibility
relation <, i.e. we stipulate that y < x if and only if xRy . The pair (X,<) is
then dubbed Kripke frame.
We adopt the variant G3K< (see Table 2) of the calculus G3K introduced
in [21] for the basic modal logic K with the additional initial sequents
y < x,Γ→ ∆, y < x (σ<)
y = x,Γ→ ∆, y = x (σ=)
and the rules for equality (see Table 2). With ¬A defined as A ⊃ ⊥, the rules
L¬, R¬ are special cases of L ⊃, R ⊃, and we do not give them explicitly.
The basic idea of the calculus is the syntactical internalisation of Kripke
semantics: the calculus operates on labelled formulae x : A, to be read as “x
forces A”, and on relational formulae y < x. For each connective and for the
modality 2 the rules are obtained directly from the inductive forcing clauses
for compound formulae.
As is common, we denote by G3K∗< the extension of G3K< with additional
rules corresponding to frame properties ∗, The situation is as as laid out in Table
1, in which we use the common abbreviation ∀y < xA for ∀y(y < x⇒ A).
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Frame property Rule
Reflexivity x < x,Γ→ ∆
Ref
Γ→ ∆∀x(x < x)
Irreflexivity
Irref
x < x,Γ→ ∆∀x(x ≮ x)
Transitivity x < z, x < y, y < z,Γ→ ∆
Trans
x < y, y < z,Γ→ ∆∀x∀y < x∀z < y(z < x)
Table 1
Additional rules for G3K∗< and the corresponding frame properties
Initial sequents
x : P,Γ→ ∆, x : P
x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : A
y < x,Γ→ ∆, y < x
x = y,Γ→ ∆, x = y
Propositional rules
x : A, x : B,Γ→ ∆
L∧
x : A ∧B,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x : A Γ→ ∆, x : B
R∧
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∧B
x : A,Γ→ ∆ x : B,Γ→ ∆
L∨
x : A ∨B,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x : A, x : B
R∨
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∨B
Γ→ ∆, x : A x : B,Γ→ ∆
L⊃
x : A ⊃ B,Γ→ ∆
x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : B
R⊃
Γ→ ∆, x : A ⊃ B
L⊥
x : ⊥,Γ→ ∆
Modal rules
y : A, x : A, y < x,Γ→ ∆
L
x : A, y < x,Γ→ ∆
y < x,Γ→ ∆, y : A
R (y fresh)
Γ→ ∆, x : A
Rules for equality
x = x,Γ→ ∆
Eq-Ref
Γ→ ∆
x = z, x = y, y = z,Γ→ ∆
Eq-Trans
x = y, y = z,Γ→ ∆
y < z, x = y, x < z,Γ→ ∆
Repl<1
x = y, x < z,Γ→ ∆
x < y, z = y, x < z,Γ→ ∆
Repl<2
z = y, x < z,Γ→ ∆
y : P, x = y, x : P,Γ→ ∆
ReplAt
x = y, x : P,Γ→ ∆
Table 2
The sequent calculus G3K<
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Derivable sequents
x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : A
x : A ⊃ B, x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : B
→ x : (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
Admissible rule: Substitution
Γ→ ∆
Subs
Γ[y/x]→ ∆[y/x]
Admissible rules: Weakening
Γ→ ∆
LW
x : A,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆
RW
Γ→ ∆, x : A
Γ→ ∆
LW<
y < x,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆
RW<
Γ→ ∆, y < x
Admissible rule: Necessitation
→ x : A
N→ x : A
Admissible rules: Contraction
x : A, x : A,Γ→ ∆
LC
x : A,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x : A, x : A
RC
Γ→ ∆, x : A
y < x, y < x,Γ→ ∆
LC<
y < x,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, y < x, y < x
RC<
Γ→ ∆, y < x
Admissible rule: Replacement
y : A, x = y, x : A,Γ→ ∆
Repl
x = y, x : A,Γ→ ∆
Admissible rules: Cut
Γ→ ∆, x : A x : A,Γ′ → ∆′
Cut
Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′
Γ→ ∆, y < x y < x,Γ′ → ∆′
Cut<
Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′
Γ→ ∆, y = x y = x,Γ′ → ∆′
Cut=
Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′
Table 3
Structural properties and admissible rules of the sequent calculus G3K<
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The calculus G3K< satisfies the following structural properties (for more
detail see Table 3, and for a proof see Section 11.4 of [23]):
(i) Sequents of the forms
x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : A
x : A ⊃ B, x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : B
→ x : (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
are derivable in G3K∗< for arbitrary modal formulae A and B.
(ii) The rules of substitution, weakening, contraction and replacement for ar-
bitrary formulae are height-preserving admissible in G3K∗<.
(iii) The rule of necessitation is admissible in G3K∗<.
(iv) All the rules of the system G3K∗< are height-preserving invertible.
(v) The Cut rule is admissible in G3K<.
Since we add the initial sequents σ<, σ=, we also need the following:
Lemma 2.1 Rules Cut< and Cut= are admissible in G3K<.
Proof. The proof is induction as the proof of admissibility of Cut (see [23],
Theorem 11.9), from which we exclude the cases in which the cut formula
is principal as no rule has instances of =, < as principal formulae. All the
remaining cases are completely analogous to their counterparts in the proof of
admissibility of Cut. 2
Two important results, to which we will collectively refer as completeness,
carry over from [22]:
Theorem 2.2 Let Γ → ∆ be a sequent in the language of G3K∗<. Then
either the sequent is derivable in G3K∗< or it has a Kripke countermodel with
properties ∗.
Corollary 2.3 If a sequent Γ → ∆ is valid in every Kripke model with the
frame properties ∗, then it is derivable in the system G3K∗<.
2.1 Connective-like rules for propositional variables
In some of the applications below, we will need to add a propositional variable P
to the language of K that will have a “connective-like” behavior. For instance,
suppose that we want a variable P to behave at x as Q(x) ⊃ R(x). In order
to avoid self-referential definitions, we ask Q and R not to contain P . We then
add the following clause to the definition of val:
x  P if and only if Q(x)⇒ R(x)
Doing so, we further add to G3K∗< a pair of rules that mirror the logical rules:
Γ→ ∆, Q(x) R(x),Γ→ ∆
LP
x : P,Γ→ ∆
Q(x),Γ→ ∆, R(x)
RP
Γ→ ∆, x : P
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Since they have the same behavior as the logical connectives, all proofs given or
referred to in the last section can easily be generalised to extensions of G3K<
by rules of this kind. In particular, LP and RP are invertible and completeness
still holds. We just point out that in the proof of admissibility of Cut, we have
to be careful when considering the case in which the cut formula is principal
in both premisses. For instance when we transform
Q(x),Γ→ ∆, R(x)
RP
Γ→ ∆, x : P
Γ′ → ∆′, Q(x) R(x),Γ′ → ∆′
LP
x : P,Γ′ → ∆′
Cut
Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′
into
Γ′ → ∆′, Q(x)
Q(x),Γ→ ∆, R(x) R(x),Γ′ → ∆′
Cut(<,=)
Q(x),Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′
Cut(<,=)
Γ,Γ′,Γ′ → ∆,∆′,∆′
LC,RC (multiple times)
Γ,Γ′ → ∆,∆′
we have to take into consideration that Q(x), R(x) may be instances of <,=.
3 Induction principles
Induction principles are typically not expressible within a first-order language.
We now present them as ordinary rules of labelled sequent calculus. To start
with, we recall Noetherian Induction and define Go¨del–Lo¨b Induction:
∀y(∀z < y Ez ⇒ Ey)⇒ ∀y Ey (Noeth-Ind)
∀x(∀y < x(∀z < y Ez ⇒ Ey)⇒ ∀y < xEy) (GL-Ind)
They prompt us to consider two rules and an axiom on top of G3K< (rule
R-GLI is rule R-L of [23]):
y : A,Γ→ ∆, y : A
NI
Γ→ ∆, y : A
y < x, y : A,Γ→ ∆, y : A
R-GLI
Γ→ ∆, x : A
(A ⊃ A) ⊃ A (W )
Both rules come with the variable condition that y does not appear in Γ,∆.
Lemma 3.1 Let a Kripke frame (X,<) be given. The following are equivalent:
(i) Axiom W is valid in X for every formula A.
(ii) Axiom W is valid in X for every propositional variable A.
(iii) Go¨del–Lo¨b Induction holds in X, i.e.
∀x(∀y < x(∀z < y Ez ⇒ Ey)⇒ ∀y < xEy) (GL-Ind)
for any given predicate E(x) on X.
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Proof. (i)⇒(ii). Trivial.
(ii)⇒(iii). Given E(x), pick a propositional variable A and take a valuation
such that x  A if and only if E(x). Then by expanding the definitions we
have the following:
x  (A ⊃ A) ⊃ A
=⇒x  (A ⊃ A)⇒ x  A
=⇒∀y < x y  A ⊃ A⇒ ∀y < x y  A
=⇒∀y < x (y  A⇒ y  A)⇒ ∀y < x y  A
=⇒∀y < x (∀z < y z  A⇒ y  A)⇒ ∀y < x y  A
=⇒∀y < x (∀z < y Ez ⇒ Ey)⇒ ∀y < xEy
(iii)⇒(i). Given a formula A, define E(x) as x  A and read backwards the
proof of (ii)⇒(iii). 2
Lemma 3.2 The following are equivalent over G3K< without R (including
the structural rules):
(i) Rule R-GLI,
(ii) Rule R plus axiom W.
Proof. Claim 1: R-GLI⇒ R.
y < x,Γ→ ∆, y : A
LW
y < x, y : A,Γ→ ∆, y : A
R-GLI
Γ→ ∆, x : A
Claim 2: R-GLI⇒W.
y < x, y : A ⊃ A, y : A, x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A
L
y < x, y : A, x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A
R-GLI
x : (A ⊃ A)→ x : A
R⊃→ x : (A ⊃ A) ⊃ A
Claim 3: R+ W⇒ R-GLI.
y < x, y : A,Γ→ ∆, y : A
R⊃
y < x,Γ→ ∆, y : A ⊃ A
R
Γ→ ∆, x : (A ⊃ A) x : (A ⊃ A)→ x : A
Cut
Γ→ ∆, x : A
where x : (A ⊃ A)→ x : A is derivable from W by invertibility of R⊃. 2
Therefore the sequent calculus obtained by replacing R by R-GLI is an
extension of G3K<. If we further add the mathematical rules Trans and Irref ,
we get the variant G3KGL< of the calculus G3KGL [21] obtained by adding
the initial sequents σ<, σ= and removing the mathematical rules Trans, Irref.
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Lemma 3.3 Let a Kripke frame (X,<) be given. The following are equivalent:
(i) Rule NI is sound in X.
(ii) For every propositional variable A, in X we have
∀y (y  A⇒ y  A)⇒ ∀y y  A
for any given valuation  on X.
(iii) Noetherian Induction holds in X, i.e.
∀y(∀z < y Ez ⇒ Ey)⇒ ∀y Ey (Noeth-Ind)
for any given predicate E(x) on X.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii). Suppose that, for all y, y  A implies y  A. It follows
that the sequent y : A → y : A is valid, hence, by completeness, derivable.
Applying rule NI we can therefore derive → y : A
y : A→ y : A
NI→ y : A
and by soundness we obtain that for all y, y  A.
(ii)⇒(iii). Given E(x), pick a propositional variable A and take a valuation
such that x  A if and only if E(x). Then:
∀y (y  A⇒ y  A)⇒ ∀y y  A
=⇒∀y (∀z < y z  A⇒ y  A)⇒ ∀y y  A
=⇒∀y (∀z < y Ez ⇒ Ey)⇒ ∀y Ey
(iii)⇒(i). Given a formula A, define E(x) as x  A and read backwards the
proof of (ii)⇒(iii). 2
The lemmata proved in this section allow us to transform rather algebraic
proofs using induction into tree-like derivations in modal logic, following a
certain pattern:
Proof transformation pattern Let X be a set endowed with a binary re-
lation <. Suppose that we need to show either
(i) a statement of the form ∀y E(y) by way of Noeth-Ind, or
(ii) a statement of the form ∀x∀y < xE(y) by way of GL-Ind.
We consider (X,<) as a Kripke frame, and build a Kripke model as follows.
First, we consider a suitable subformula U(x) of E(x) such that it can be
encoded in a sequent Q(x) → R(x), and fix a propositional variable P . We
define a valuation such that val : (x, P ) = 1 if and only if U(x). This is done
by adding (variants of) the following rules to the calculus:
Γ→ ∆, Q(x) R(x),Γ→ ∆
LP
x : P,Γ→ ∆
Q(x),Γ→ ∆, R(x)
RP
Γ→ ∆, x : P
By means of P , we find a formula A such that x  A if and only if E(x). We
then proceed as follows:
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(i) For Noeth-Ind : Derive the sequent y : A → y : A by using G3K< plus
RP and LP, then apply rule NI :
...
y : A→ y : A
NI→ y : A
(ii) For GL-Ind : Derive the sequent y < x, y : A → y : A by using G3K<
plus RP and LP, then apply rule R-GLI :
...
y < x, y : A→ y : A
R-GLI
Γ→ ∆, x : A
We point out that this pattern is not fully general, as we do not yet have a
universal method to find the subformula U(x) needed to define the valuation.
3.1 Examples
Example 3.4 GL-Ind implies that ∀y < x(y 6= x). 4
Proof. [algebraic] In order to apply GL-Ind, we need to show that ∀y < x(∀z <
y(z 6= x)⇒ y 6= x). Fix y < x such that ∀z < y(z 6= x). We need to show that
y 6= x. Suppose y = x. Then x < x and ∀z < x(z 6= x), from which we derive
x 6= x. Therefore y 6= x and we proved our claim. 2
Proof. [modal] Fix x. Pick P such that y  P if and only if y = x. This
corresponds to the rules
y = x,Γ→ ∆
LP
y : P,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, y = x
RP
Γ→ ∆, y : P
Then our thesis is equivalent to say that → x : ¬P is derivable in G3K<
plus R-GLI, LP and RP :
y = x, y < y, y : ¬P → y : ⊥, y = x
RP
y = x, y < y, y : ¬P → y : ⊥, y : P
L¬
y : ¬P, y = x, y < y, y : ¬P → y : ⊥
L
y = x, y < y, y : ¬P → y : ⊥
Repl
y = x, y < x, y : ¬P → y : ⊥
LP
y < x, y : ¬P, y : P → y : ⊥
R⊃
y < x, y : ¬P → y : ¬P
R-GLI→ x : ¬P
2
4 If we observe that ∀y < x(y 6= x) is just a variant of irreflexivity ∀x(x ≮ x), then this
result will be for free once we have proved Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.3.
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Example 3.5 What follows is a somewhat more general formulation of the fact
that by Noetherian induction every meet-closed predicate on a poset propagates
from the irreducible elements to any element whatsoever [28,31,32].
Consider a ternary predicate x = y ◦ z. We say that x is ◦-reducible (for
short R◦(x)) if there are y < x and z < x such that x = y ◦ z.
Let E(x) be a predicate satisfying
x = y ◦ z E(y) E(z)
E(x) (∗)
for every y, z. Then Noeth-Ind implies ∀x(R◦(x) ∨ E(x))⇒ ∀xE(x).
Proof. [algebraic] Assume that ∀x(R◦(x)∨E(x)). In order to apply induction,
we need to show that ∀x(∀y < xE(y)⇒ E(x)). Fix x such that ∀y < xE(y).
It now suffices to show E(x). By assumption, we can distinguish two cases:
• Case E(x): Trivial.
• Case R◦(x): Take y < x and z < x such that x = y ◦ z. By ∀y < xE(y) we
know that E(y) and E(z). This, by (∗) implies E(x).
2
Proof. [modal] Pick a propositional variable P such that x  P if and only if
E(x). The hypothesis (∗) can be written as:
x : P, y : P, z : P, x = y ◦ z,Γ→ ∆
(∗)
y : P, z : P, x = y ◦ z,Γ→ ∆
The definition of being ◦-reducible can be used in the calculus via the rule
x = y ◦ z, y < x, z < x,Γ→ ∆
LR◦
R◦(x),Γ→ ∆
where y, z are fresh, together with the appropriate RR◦ rule. The thesis be-
comes that from the sequent → R◦(x), x : P we can derive → x : P in G3K<
using NI, (∗), LR◦ and RR◦. In fact:
→ R◦(x), x : P
x = y ◦ z, y < x, z < x, x : P, z : P, y : P, x : P → x : P
(∗)
x = y ◦ z, y < x, z < x, z : P, y : P, x : P → x : P
L
x = y ◦ z, y < x, z < x, y : P, x : P → x : P
L
x = y ◦ z, y < x, z < x, x : P → x : P
LR◦
R◦(x), x : P → x : P
Cut
x : P → x : P
NI→ x : P
2
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4 Consequences
In this section we apply the tools that we have just developed, in order to
revisit certain common properties of the accessibility relation <. In particular,
this will lead us to useful characterisations of the induction principles that can
simplify the task of controlling that they hold in a given structure. We will
further shed some more light on the role of transitivity in the calculus.
4.1 Irreflexivity & Noetherianity
The binary relation < on X is said to be irreflexive if ∀x(x ≮ x), which
corresponds to the following rule
Irref
x < x,Γ→ ∆
Lemma 4.1 Noetherian Induction implies irreflexivity. 5
Proof. To show this claim, we use the syntactical proof pattern introduced in
Section 3. Pick P such that x  P if and only if x < x, i.e. such that
x < x,Γ→ ∆
LP
x : P,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x < x
RP
Γ→ ∆, x : P
Then we just need to show → x : ¬P in G3K< plus NI, LP and RP :
x : ¬P, x < x→ x < x
RP
x < x, x : ¬P → x : P
L¬
x : ¬P, x < x, x : ¬P →
L
x < x, x : ¬P →
LP
x : P, x : ¬P →
R¬
x : ¬P → x : ¬P
NI→ x : ¬P
From this we also get admissibility of the rule version of irreflexivity:
→ x : ¬P
x < x,Γ→ ∆, x < x
RP
x < x,Γ→ ∆, x : ¬P
L¬
x : ¬P, x < x,Γ→ ∆
Cut
x < x,Γ→ ∆
2
As in mathematical practice one often talks about ascending chains, we now
occasionally switch back to R. So let y < x if and only if xRy: that is, < and
R are converse to each other. Notice that < is irreflexive if and only if so is R.
5 This lemma is a formal direct version of “every well-founded relation is irreflexive”, to be
compared with “Set Induction implies ∀x(x /∈ x)” [1–3] as a direct version of “Foundation
implies ∀x(x /∈ x)” in axiomatic set theory.
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An infinite R-sequence is a sequence (xi)i∈N of elements of X such that
xiRxi+1 for all i ∈ N. An infinite R-sequence (xi)i∈N is convergent if there
is i ∈ N such that xj = xi for all j > i. We say that R is well-founded if
there is no infinite R-sequence; and that R is Noetherian—for short, R satisfies
Noeth—if every infinite R-sequence converges.
While the first and second item of the next lemma are well-known to be
equivalent, the occurrence of irreflexivity in the third item is due to the fact
that a priori R and < need not possess this feature of an order relation.
Proposition 4.2 The following are equivalent:
(i) < satisfies Noetherian Induction.
(ii) R is well-founded.
(iii) R is irreflexive and Noetherian.
Proof. The equivalence of the first and the second item is folklore. See Lemma
4.1 for a formal proof that Noetherian Induction implies irreflexivity. If R is
well-founded, i.e. there are no infinite R-sequences at all, then R is trivially
Noetherian. As for the converse, if R is irreflexive, then no infinite R-sequence
converges; whence if, in addition, R is Noetherian, then R is well-founded. 2
Notice in this context that if R is Noetherian, it is not always the case that
< satisfies Noeth-Ind. In fact, the relation R with the following graph
x
does not satisfy Noeth-Ind because it is not irreflexive, but R is Noetherian
because the only infinite R-sequence, which is xRxRxR..., converges.
4.2 Transitivity & Induction
The binary relation < on X is said to be transitive if ∀x∀y < x∀z < y(z < x),
which corresponds to the following rule
z < x, z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
Trans
z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
In the light of Proposition 4.2, what we prove next in G3K< is a formal
version of Segerberg’s theorem [35] that the Go¨del–Lo¨b axiom describes exactly
the (converse) well-founded transitive Kripke frames.
Theorem 4.3 The following are equivalent:
(i) Go¨del–Lo¨b Induction,
(ii) Noetherian Induction + Transitivity.
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Proof. Claim 1: GL-Ind⇒ Noeth-Ind. It suffices to show that rule NI is ad-
missible in G3KGL<:
x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : A
Subs
y : A,Γ→ ∆, y : A
LW
y < x, y : A,Γ→ ∆, y : A
R-GLI
Γ→ ∆, x : A x : A,Γ→ ∆, x : A
Cut
Γ,Γ→ ∆,∆, x : A
LC,RC (multiple times)
Γ→ ∆, x : A
Claim 2: GL-Ind⇒ Trans. To show this claim, we use the syntactical proof
pattern introduced in Section 3. Fix x. Pick P such that y  P if and only if
y < x, i.e. such that
y < x,Γ→ ∆
LP
y : P,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, y < x
RP
Γ→ ∆, y : P
It suffices to show that rule Trans is admissible in G3KGL< plus LP and RP:
→ x : (P ∧ P )
z < x, z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
LW
z < x, y : P, y : P, x : (P ∧ P ), z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
LP
z : P, y : P, y : P, x : (P ∧ P ), z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
L
y : P, y : P, x : (P ∧ P ), z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
L∧
y : P ∧ P, x : (P ∧ P ), z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
L
x : (P ∧ P ), z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
Cut
z < y, y < x,Γ→ ∆
where → x : (P ∧ P ) is derived as follows: 6
y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ y : P
y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ y < x
RP
y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ y : P
R∧
y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ y : P ∧ P
R-GLI→ x : (P ∧ P )
where y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ y : P is derived as follows:
z : P, z : P, z < y, z : P, y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ z : P
L∧
z : P ∧ P, z < y, z : P, y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ z : P
L
y < x, y : (P ∧ P )→ y : P
6 Notice that the sequent→ x : (P ∧P ) corresponds to ∀x∀y < x(∀z < y(z < x) & y < x),
which is a redundant version of transitivity as y < x is repeated both in the premisses and
in the conclusions. The reason why we need this version and not the “standard” one (as, for
instance, in the case of Irref in Lemma 4.1), will become clear in the next subsection.
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Claim 3: Noeth-Ind + Trans⇒ GL-Ind. It suffices to show that Axiom W is
derivable in G3K< plus NI and Trans:
y : A, y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A D1
L⊃
y : A ⊃ A, y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A
L
y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A
R
x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A)→ x : A
R⊃
x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A)→ x : (A ⊃ A) ⊃ A
NI→ x : (A ⊃ A) ⊃ A
where D1 is the following derivation:
y : A, y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A, y : A D2
L⊃
y : (A ⊃ A) ⊃ A, y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A, y : A
L
y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A)→ y : A, y : A
where D2 is the following derivation:
z : A ⊃ A, z < x, z < y, y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A) → y : A, y : A, z : A ⊃ A
L
z < x, z < y, y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A) → y : A, y : A, z : A ⊃ A
Trans
z < y, y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A) → y : A, y : A, z : A ⊃ A
L⊃
y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A) → y : A, y : A, y : (A ⊃ A)
R
y < x, x : ((A ⊃ A) ⊃ A), x : (A ⊃ A) → y : A, y : A, y : (A ⊃ A)
2
Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.2 help to see that Noeth-Ind ; GL-Ind. In
fact, the structure
y xz
satisfies both Noeth and Irref, but not Trans.
4.3 Transitivity & Cut
The rule Cut is known to be admissible in the calculus G3GL and thus, by
equivalence, in G3KGL [23, Theorem 12.20]. As a consequence, Cut is also
admissible in G3KGL< if we add Trans and Irref . Are these two rules really
needed for Cut admissibility?
Lemma 4.4 The following sequents are Cut-free derivable in G3KGL<:
(i) x : A→ x : (A ∧A), 7
(ii) x : (A ∧A)→ x : A.
Proof. (i)
y : A, y < x, y : (A ∧A), x : A→ y : A
L
y < x, y : (A ∧A), x : A→ y : A D
R∧
y < x, y : (A ∧A), x : A→ y : A ∧A
R-GLI
x : A→ x : (A ∧A)
7 This is actually the redundant version of transitivity that we had in the proof of Theorem
4.3. Here, the definition of y  A as y < x is gained by the addition of the premiss x : A.
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where D is the following derivation:
z : A, z : A, z < y, z : A, y < x, y : (A ∧A), x : A→ z : A
L∧
z : A ∧A, z < y, z : A, y < x, y : (A ∧A), x : A→ z : A
L
z < y, z : A, y < x, y : (A ∧A), x : A→ z : A
R-GLI
y < x, y : (A ∧A), x : A→ y : A
(ii)
y : A, y : A, y < x, y : A, x : (A ∧A)→ y : A
L∧
y : A ∧A, y < x, y : A, x : (A ∧A)→ y : A
L
y < x, y : A, x : (A ∧A)→ y : A
R-GLI
x : (A ∧A)→ x : A
2
Theorem 4.5 The Cut rule is not admissible in G3KGL< without Trans.
Proof. If Cut were admissible, then by Lemma 4.4 the sequent x : A →
x : A would be Cut-free derivable. 8 Let’s try to give a Cut-free proof:
y : A, z < y, z : A, y < x, y : A, x : A→ z : A
L
y : A, z < y, z : A, y < x, y : A, x : A→ z : A
R-GLI
y < x, y : A, x : A→ y : A
R-GLI
x : A→ x : A
Observe, however, that the upper-most sequent is not derivable in general. In
fact, we have a countermodel:
x  Ay  A, y  Az  A, z 1 A
Notice that this is a non-transitive model. 2
As a consequence, we get that the assumption of Trans is necessary in the
aforementioned proof of Cut-admissibility in G3KGL<.
9
8 The sequent x : A → x : A corresponds to transitivity the same way the sequent
x : A → x : (A ∧ A) corresponds to redundant transitivity from footnote 6. What we
are showing is actually that the “standard” version of transitivity can be deduced from the
redundant version by using Cut and that Cut is necessary in any proof of transitivity. This
is why we needed the redundant version in the first place.
9 This may look a bit counterintuitive: a mathematical principle, transitivity, corresponds
to a derivable sequent, but is also equivalent, modulo irreflexivity, to a structural rule. How-
ever, this is not really astonishing: Cut can be viewed as a form of transitivity, as it is a
generalisation of the following:
∀C∀B(B ⊃ C ⇒ ∀A(A ⊃ B ⇒ A ⊃ C))
which is just transitivity of ⊃ seen as a relation. This is also the reason for which the Cut in
literature is sometimes called Trans, e.g. when dealing with Scott-style entailment relations
(cf [34]; for recent work see, e.g., [10, 15,16,29,30,33,39]).
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5 Future work
The calculus G3K< is classical, but the applications studied up to now have
a purely constructive proof in their algebraic counterpart. This makes us con-
fident that we can replace G3K< by an intuitionistic modal calculus, such as
the one presented in [20].
Furthermore, those applications have not yet suggested a general method
to find the subformula U(x) required to define the valuation; whence we will
next try to pin down such a general method.
Other principles related to induction are worth a closer look. Apart from
the notions of Noetherianity discussed in [13, 25], there is Grzegorczyk induc-
tion [14], which is a weaker form of induction compatible with reflexivity. Also
the principles of transitivity and irreflexivity deserve further investigation, es-
pecially in connection with Cut-elimination, as well as the variant GH of the
Go¨del–Lo¨b axiom [8]. There is already some work in progress on relating this
approach with Peano Induction, which will likely lead to similar results in Or-
dinal Induction.
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